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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Surely the bleeding of Philadelphia-area jobs — 140,000 fewer manufacturing jobs in 1980 than 
in 1970 — set the climate. Yet the plant closing ordinance could not have been passed without the skillful 
organizing efforts of the Delaware Valley Coalition for Jobs (DVCJ). Virtually all of the pro-ordinance 
testimony presented in City Council hearings was orchestrated by DVCJ. At the hearings, DVCJ arranged 
for statements from dozens of witnesses - unionists, unemployed activists, families of laid-off workers, 
community leaders, clergy, lawyers, and academics (like myself). 
The victory in the Philadelphia City Council was a major accomplishment for DVCJ and the plant closing 
fight in general. But the new law is not being enforced by the city, and the anti-plant-closing movement is 
stalled. Partly, this situation arose because DVCJ is a defensively-oriented direct action group and not 
primarily a legislative lobbying group. The coalition paid less attention to the details of legislative 
processes and enforcement mechanisms than to rallying support for the idea of a law. DVCJ's strength 
has been in mobilizing mass actions against plant closings and in agitating for full employment policies. 
Jobs coalitions such as DVCJ have great potential for changing the public agenda on job loss and 
unemployment, but they also have some inherent stumbling blocks. The example of DVCJ, one of the 
more successful jobs coalitions, illustrates some of the strengths and weaknesses of the movement 
against plant closings in general. 
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SHUTDOWNS 
& THE NEW 
JOBS COALITIONS 
the Philadelphia Experience 
• Arthur Hochner 
"The worst legislative body in the free world," raged Mayor William 
Green of Philadelphia in June 1982. Over Mayor Green's veto, the 
City Council had made Philadelphia the first major city in the country 
with a plant closing law, requiring businesses to give sixty days notice 
before closure or relocation of operations. The mayor's denunciations 
of the Council were echoed by business spokespeople who howled 
about the "hostile business climate" the law would foster. 
What had united the Philadelphia City Council so solidly behind 
a bill so despised by business and Mayor Green's administration? 
Surely the bleeding of Philadelphia-area jobs—140,000 fewer 
manufacturing jobs in 1980 than in 1970—set the climate. Yet the 
plant closing ordinance could not have been passed without the 
skillful organizing efforts of the Delaware Valley Coalition for Jobs 
(DVCJ). Virtually all of the pro-ordinance testimony presented in City 
Council hearings was orchestrated by DVCJ. At the hearings, DVCJ 
arranged for statements from dozens of witnesses—unionists, 
unemployed activists, families of laid-off workers, community 
leaders, clergy, lawyers, and academics (like myself). 
The victory in the Philadelphia City Council was a major accom-
plishment for DVCJ and the plant closing fight in general. But the 
new law is not being enforced by the city, and the anti-plant-closing 
movement is stalled. Partly, this situation arose because DVCJ is a 
defensively-oriented direct action group and not primarily a 
legislative lobbying group. The coalition paid less attention to the 
details of legislative processes and enforcement mechanisms than 
to rallying support for the idea of a law. DVCJ's strength has been 
in mobilizing mass actions against plant closings and in agitating for 
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full employment policies. 
Jobs coalitions such as DVCJ have great potential for changing the 
public agenda on job loss and unemployment, but they also have 
some inherent stumbling blocks. The example of DVCJ, one of the 
more successful jobs coaUtions, illustrates some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the movement against plant closings in general. 
DVCJ in National Perspective 
DVCJ was founded in December 1979 by leaders of 40 labor, 
church and community organizations in the Philadelphia area. 
Although its size has waxed and waned, it has been a constant 
presence in the area. It has held press conferences, pickets, rallies, 
marches, demonstrations, and campaigns concerning particular plant 
closings; it has sponsored 
conferences and mobilized mass 
lobbying actions in Harrisburg and 
Washington, involving many of 
the major unions in the area, as 
well as significant numbers of 
local clergy, churchpeople, and 
other citizen activists. 
The DVCJ is unusual, but it is 
not unique. Similar organizations 
have sprung up elsewhere in the 
United States. These local 
coalitions unite unions, public 
interest organizations, clergy, 
neighborhood and senior citizen 
groups and academics to perform 
several activities: responding to 
calls for help in particular closings 
and mass layoffs; providing public 
forums for the issues through 
literature, conferences, rallies, demonstrations, and publicity 
campaigns; and lobbying in legislative bodies for bills regulating 
shutdowns and mass layoffs, as well as for other bills relevant to jobs, 
unemployment, and welfare. 
As the pace of plant closings accelerated through the late 1970s, 
coalitions formed in many states, primarily to press for plant closing 
legislation. Jobs coaUtions formed in several states, including 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Illinois, Oregon and California. In each of these states—as weU as 
in Delaware, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin—plant closing legislation has been introduced into the 
legislatures. 
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The Emergence of DVCJ 
The Delaware Valley is comprised of southeastern Pennsylvania, 
southern New Jersey and northern Delaware, a region traversed by 
the Delaware River and dominated by Philadelphia. The Valley has 
a highly diversified economy, though manufacturing has historically 
been its strength. In the 1970s, however, recessions and corporate 
reshufflings brought swift change and massive disinvestment. A 
report by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment Security showed 
that between 1969 and 1979 more than 170 firms of greater than 
30 employees closed plants in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 
The rapid pace of shutdowns and relocations rocked workers in 
virtually all sectors and industries. 
In early 1979, several groups of activists came together to plan a 
conference, which they called "Save Our Jobs and Build Our 
Neighborhoods." It was sponsored by four groups: 1) the Delaware 
Valley United Labor Committee for Full Employment, a group of 
progressive union leaders and activists, who wanted to get around 
the inertia of the local Central Labor Council; 2) the Human 
Resources Development Institute, the AFL-CIO's manpower and 
training arm; 3) the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood 
Organizations, itself a coalition of groups from most of Philadelphia's 
neighborhoods, headed by a Catholic priest; and, 4) the Philadelphia 
Unemployment Project (PUP), an organization of and for the 
unemployed formed in the 1974-75 recession. John Dodds, director 
of PUP, had long been working with unions and church people on 
unemployment issues. 
Many of the conference planners and scheduled participants had 
worked together before. In the J.P. Stevens boycott campaign from 
1976-80, ACTWU unionists, clergy, community and civil rights 
leaders, academics, and politicians had joined together. Dodds and 
PUP had previously worked with the UAW to get laid-off workers 
Trade Readjustment Assistance benefits. And many of the unionists 
had joined forces through the Philadelphia Project on Occupational 
Safety and Health (PHILAPOSH). 
The actual spur for the 1979 "Save Our Jobs" conference came 
from the UAW's efforts to fight the closing of Gould-ITE. The Illinois-
based Gould conglomerate had bought ITE Imperial, a 100-year old 
local company in the auto parts industry, and was slowly but surely 
closing it. Joseph Ferrara, area director of UAW Sub-Region 9, was 
very involved in this fight. He wanted to build a campaign around 
the Gould closing and to create a permanent link between unionists 
and the unemployed to fight future closings and job loss. Other 
concerns of the conference included community control of local 
economic development, improvement of CETA and manpower 
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programs, and the creation of jobs. 
From the conference planners' viewpoint, their timing couldn't 
have been better. On January 23, 1979, the Food Fair chain abruptly 
announced that in four days it would shut 128 local supermarkets, 
throwing more than 4400 people out of work. David Neifeld, vice 
president of Retail Clerks (UFCW) Local 1357, to which the Food 
Fair workers belonged, was one of the conference planners. The 
"Save Our Jobs" conference, held Saturday, February 10, at the 
ACTWU Hall in South Philadelphia, drew more than 600 persons, 
most of whom participated in the workshop on plant closings. Among 
those present were four Philadelphia-area Congressmen and several 
Pennsylvania state representatives. Pledges to support national and 
statewide plant closing bills were made by several legislators. 
The Food Fair closing brought many to the conference, and the 
stories of that shutdown and of the Gould case enraged other unions. 
Officials of UFCW Local 1357 recounted the financial finagling and 
mismanagement of Food Fair executives. UAW officials discussed the 
lies and deceptions of the Gould company concerning its future plans. 
Out of the 1979 conference came a closer, but still loose, knitting 
together of groups around shutdowns and runaway shops. PUP 
became the focal point of local efforts to fight layoffs. One of the 
first activities was a march by 3000 people from City Hall to the U.S. 
Labor Department's regional headquarters to protest proposed CETA 
layoffs. The march committee was called "First Things First—Jobs 
Coalition" and was comprised of PUP, AFSCME locals, the CETA 
Workers Organization, and several community groups. In late Octo-
ber 1979 U.S. Senate hearings were held in Camden on the national 
plant closing bill. Testimony was given by union leaders from many 
unions in the area, including ACTWU, IUE, UFCW, USWA, ILGWU, 
and Joe Ferrara of the UAW. These witnesses detailed the ongoing 
pattern of shutdowns and runaways and the hardships faced by 
workers with no advance notice or other protection. 
Then, on November 16, 1979, at 10:30 a.m., four hundred workers 
at Cross Brothers Meat Packing were shocked to hear that in just 
four hours, the 59-year old company was permanently closing. PUP 
and a coalition of groups, many of which had attended the February 
conference, joined a demonstration of Cross Brothers workers in front 
of the meat plant to protest the closing and to publicize the state plant 
closing bill, which was stuck in the House Labor Relations 
Committee. 
A week later, the fight against the Gould closing resumed with Joe 
Ferrara in the lead. One hundred-fifty people picketed the Gould 
plant near downtown Philadelphia, protesting the removal of 
equipment to new plants in the South and the company's plan to 
move 2200 jobs. Although an arbitrator had ruled earlier in the year 
aaatfefeba t^f&k Aiti-kv^ik. 
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to protect the Philadelphia plant's jobs, UAW Local 1612 accused the 
company of not living up to that ruling. The picketers included retired 
UAW members, members of other unions, PUP members, and 
members of the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood 
Organizations; the local union had been legally prohibited from 
picketing. 
Shortly after the Cross Brothers closing, forty leaders of church, 
community, and labor organizations met at UAW Local 1612's hall 
to form the Delaware Valley Coalition for Jobs (DVCJ). The coalition's 
aims were to combat plant and store closings with educational and 
lobbying actions. A structure was established and regular meetings 
of a steering committee were scheduled. Joe Ferrara was selected 
as chairman, and John Dodds of PUP became the active director. 
The constituent groups chipped in for coalition expenses, and a staff 
organizer, Jeff Blum, was put to work. 
Blum saw the plant closing issue as a good statewide focus for 
public action organizing, along the lines of the Ohio Public Interest 
Campaign. Moreover, Blum wanted to turn the plant closing fight 
from a protest against foreign imports to a campaign against corporate 
power. He wanted to re-direct affected workers from an exclusive 
"Buy American" orientation to a fight with corporate managers over 
the control of American corporate decisions. 
Such ideas corresponded to the sentiments and beliefs of the other 
coalition members. DVCJ formulated a statement of principles: 
The Delaware Valley Coalition for Jobs believes that Big Business 
must be held responsible for the economic blight they inflict on 
working people and our neighborhoods when they decide to pack 
up and leave. We seek to establish once and for all that the public 
interest must come before the corporations' drive for ever-greater 
profits. 
The first major action DVCJ sponsored was a day of public hearings 
on plant and store closings at City Council on February 16, 1980. 
Over six hundred people attended to hear over twenty-five witnesses. 
Unionists from a dozen locals joined with clergy, community activists 
and social workers to address the community and social 
consequences of shutdowns. A city planning professor from the 
University of Pennsylvania discussed the exodus of jobs and capital 
from the Northeast and Midwest. And four local Congressmen, eight 
Pennsylvania state legislators, and a number of city officials attended 
and spoke about legislative efforts to halt job loss. 
The hearings were a fantastic kickoff for DVCJ as an organization. 
They provided a great opportunity for an outpouring of pent-up 
outrage; they served to unite unions and other groups in solidarity 
against corporate and government actions which affected them each 
*! % 
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separately. State legislation on plant closing in Pennsylvania and Rep. 
Ford's Federal bill provided a rallying point for all. 
Much attention focused on the state plant closing bill. In late 
February, DVCJ held a press conference in the State Capitol in 
Harrisburg to get the state bill out of committee. On April 11, DVCJ 
sponsored a legislative breakfast attended by fifteen state 
representatives and state senators. Over a hundred union, church 
and community leaders attended. 
DVCJ's Plant Closing Campaigns 
Despite all this attention on legislation, DVCJ saw its main purpose 
as galvanizing a mass movement. Even at the February hearings, John 
Dodds noted: "The struggle is as important as what we get out of 
it. The point is to build an awareness that corporations are doing 
us in. We're trying to build an awareness in people that we need more 
protection from corporate power." This awareness was to be built 
in the course of campaigns around particular shutdowns. 
The mobilization efforts in the Gould case set a model for DVCJ 
that was to be followed in numerous other plant closing fights over 
the next several years. Members and leaders of a local union 
threatened by a plant closing would initiate the fight and would call 
upon DVCJ for support. Coalition members would provide organizing 
and research expertise, help mobilize community support, recruit 
speakers for rallies, help prepare leaflets, press releases and other 
literature, and participate in marches, rallies, and pickets. 
On March 15,1980, over three hundred-fifty people marched from 
City Hall to the Gould plant to celebrate a partial victory in collective 
bargaining for the UAW at Gould. Combined union and DVCJ 
pressure had persuaded Gould to revise their plans for removing jobs. 
While the core of the Gould effort was located with the UAW, 
subsequent plant closing fights involving DVCJ have originated in 
a variety of other local unions, including the Paperworkers (UPIU), 
the IAM, the Dupont Employees Philadelphia Works Union, the 
Boilermakers, and the USWA. 
In November 1980, UPIU Local 392 called upon DVCJ for help. 
Local 392 represented one hundred-ten workers at a Container 
Corporation of America (CCA) folding-box plant in Manayunk, a 
close-knit, working-class neighborhood in Philadelphia. The plant 
was threatened with a Christmas closing by CCA, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Mobil Corp. Local 392 and DVCJ organized a protest 
demonstration blocking traffic on a bridge for nearly an hour. The 
purpose was to draw public and press attention to the workers' plight. 
A community meeting was held the following week in St. John the 
baptist Roman Catholic Church. DVCJ mimeographed recent 
ewspaper articles along with the meeting agenda for attendees and 
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provided some speakers, including Rev. Gracie, who had helped rally 
local clergy. Over a hundred people attended. They heard Joe Pedrick, 
president of Local 392, and other CCA employees, community 
leaders, and a few local politicians discuss the stonewalling tactics 
of CCA. 
Out of this meeting, a Manayunk Coalition to Save Jobs was 
formed. This coalition, with DVCJ's help, fought the closing for three 
months, while Local 392 tried to negotiate with CCA. In mid-
February, 1981, twenty-six activists chartered a bus to take the 
campaign to Mobil's corporate headquarters in New York City. They 
met with lower-level CCA officials who tried to put them off and 
prevented them from seeing Mobil executives. In the end, the efforts 
of Local 392 and the jobs coalition led to an agreement between CCA 
and the union for 
severance benefits 
and transfer rights. 
During the CCA-
UPIU fight, in 
early January, 
1981, Sun Ship of 
Chester, Pennsyl-
vania, a subsidiary 
of the huge Sim Co. 
(formerly Sun Oil), 
announced its deci-
sion to get out of 
the shipbuilding 
business. This 
meant a layoff of 
3100 workers. 
DVCJ and the 
Boilermakers, the 
major union at Sun 
Ship, discussed a 
campaign around 
the layoffs, but by 
union choice a 
decision was made 
not to make the 
campaign public. A 
week after the 
layoff announce-
ment, Sun Ship 
announced that it 
would commit $4 
2 2
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million to soften the economic and social effects. Up to $800,000 of 
that money was eventually given to the city of Chester as 
compensation for loss of tax revenues. 
In Spring 1981, attention shifted to the announced closing of the 
Eaton Corp.'s lift-truck plant in the Northeast section of Philadelphia. 
One thousand workers and their jobs were at stake. Eaton, a $2-billion 
conglomerate, had for years assured the workers that the plant was 
profitable and would remain open. But in early April, Eaton 
announced plans to close the lift-truck plant because it wasn't mak-
ing enough money "to maintain the minimum level of profit required 
by our strategic objectives." Operations would be shifted to Eaton 
plants in the South, in Mexico, and in Japan. IAM Local 1717 
members were infuriated to discover that their own employer was 
the "foreign competition" that was taking away their jobs. 
Union local leaders and rank-and-filers initiated a militant 
campaign against the company, which lasted for the rest of 1981. 
Business agents Tony Galvin and Danny Chmelko led a series of 
raucous demonstrations with the aid of DVJC. Chmelko, who had 
not been particularly active before, emerged as a leader. "Brothers 
and sisters," he told his fellow unionists, "it's time to do more than 
stand up for our rights. It's time to take direct action. It's time to 
fight!' 
The IAM had not been part of the coalition before, but one of the 
Eaton workers was a brother-in-law of a worker from the CCA plant, 
so he called DVCJ. Once again DVCJ provided literature, leaflets, and 
organizing help. The first major action of the campaign was a march 
blocking traffic on heavily-trafficked Roosevelt Boulevard outside the 
plant. Over two hundred protesters rallied outside the factory gates 
with colorful signs and American flags. This tactic was repeated on 
a larger scale a few weeks later, with the Eaton workers joined by 
DVCJ members. Over five hundred protesters marched on the 
Boulevard, rallied outside the fence, and then poured through a hole 
(prepared in secret the night before), and rallied right outside the 
building. The militant action brought lots of press attention to the 
Eaton workers' cause, excited the workers, and made the company 
nervous. 
Eaton workers and DVCJ kept up the pressure. They held meetings 
with a variety of union leaders in the local area. They got help from 
workers at other plants, large and small, in the neighborhood. 
Workers contacted their ministers and organized a "Coalition of 
Conscience." Seventy-five clergy of all denominations signed a 
telegram to Eaton chairman E.M. de Windt, asking for a 
reconsideration of the closing. In June, the campaign held a march 
of five hundred workers through center-city Philadelphia to City Hall. 
The campaign failed to reverse Eaton's closing decision, but it 
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helped slow and ease the layoff. Local 1717 won an agreement with 
Eaton to quadruple the severance pay the company had been 
contractually obligated to pay and won life-time medical coverage 
and early retirement benefits for hundreds of Eaton workers and 
retirees. 
Finally in late 1982, DVCJ worked with two USWA locals to keep 
open a small, locally-owned steel fabricating plant. The owners gave 
into pressure and decided to keep the plant open, saving one 
hundred-twenty-six jobs. 
Broader Efforts 
PUP and DVCJ efforts, coordinated by Jeff Blum, led in the summer 
of 1980 to the formation of the Pennsylvania Public Interest Coalition 
(PennPIC). PennPIC opened offices in Harrisburg, Allentown, Erie, 
and Pittsburgh. Harry Boyer, the state AFL-CIO president, became 
one of its four co-chairs, along with Joe Ferrara of DVCJ and two 
clergymen. DVCJ became the Philadelphia chapter of PennPIC. 
PennPIC took plant closings as its leading issue to build a statewide 
base. While DVCJ was based in the plant closing fight, it had also 
involved itself in more general unemployed and welfare issues, 
reflecting the importance of PUP's part in DVCJ. PennPIC went even 
further afield. Jeff Blum wanted to create a state-wide multi-issue 
progressive coalition. The plant closing fight would be a jumping-
off point for a diverse set of concerns, such as oil tax loopholes, gas 
decontrol, fair interest rates, and electoral campaigns. 
On October 6, 1981, PennPIC and the state AFL-CIO held a mass 
rally and "lobby day" inside the State Capitol. This demonstration, 
coming on the heels of September's national Solidarity Day in 
Washington, attracted about a thousand participants—laid-off 
steelworkers from Pittsburgh, PUP and DVCJ activists from 
Philadelphia, and leaders of civil rights, welfare, and community 
groups from throughout the state. Although the main focus was the 
state plant closing bill, participants also lobbied against tax breaks 
for big business and against antiquated welfare policies. 
DVCJ and PennPIC consistently kept the issues before workers, 
communities, the general public, and the politicians through a variety 
of tactics. An article by the Philadelphia Inquirer's Harrisburg 
correspondent in late 1981 looked at the campaign against plant 
closings this way: "The difference between the tactics being used 
in Philadelphia and the approach being used in Harrisburg is like 
the difference between guerilla warfare and conventional 
warfare . . . In Philadelphia, the DVCJ uses tactics employed by civil 
rights and anti-war activists to draw attention to their causes." 
Although the state plant closing bill remained stalled in Republican-
controlled legislative commitees, the contacts forged with politicians 
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at both the state and local levels were valuable. DVCJ and PennPIC 
succeeded in stopping corporate tax breaks in the Pennsylvania 
legislature in 1981. And in 1982, Philadelphia City Councilman John 
Anderson drafted a plant closing ordinance for Philadelphia, 
providing for sixty days' advance notice to the city and the affected 
workers and their unions. Passage of this bill in June 1982 prompted 
the angry remarks of Mayor Green cited earlier. 
The Ebbing of Activity 
Surprisingly since the Philadelphia plant closing ordinance became 
law, DVCJ has lost some of its momentum. Partly this reflects the 
split that occurred between DVCJ and PennPIC late in 1982. The split 
involved: (a) PennPIC's politics—a shift toward broader consumer 
issues; (b) its methods—greater emphasis on electoral involvement; 
(c) organization—a shift of concern and of control away from 
Philadelphia, as well as toward the national organization, "Citizen 
Action," a coalition of statewide organizations. 
Mostly however, the ebbing of DVCJ activity reflects the shifting 
of momentum from preventing plant closings to dealing with their 
aftermath and with Reaganomics. DVCJ activities always waned 
between particular plant closing fights. Now the ranks of DVCJ 
activists have been thinned by their need to go on to other jobs and 
activities. Furthermore, local activity shifted back toward PUP and 
its focus on serving the poor and unemployed. The fight to preserve 
extended Federal unemployment benefits once again grew in 
importance. In early 1983 PUP, with DVCJ support, began a long 
battle to halt the growing number of mortgage foreclosures. After 
almost a year of constant organizing, demonstrating, pressuring banks 
and local authorities, arguing in court, and lobbying the legislature, 
PUP was successful. Not only did they arrange a court-imposed 
moratorium on foreclosures in Philadelphia, PUP's work also won 
passage of a bill to provide $5 million in state money for low-interest 
loans to unemployed workers. 
At present DVCJ activities are in a state of some indecisiveness. 
Rev. Gracie described the situation that occurred at a luncheon 
meeting in early 1984 of coalition activists. A very warm comradeship 
has developed among the church, union, and unemployed groups, 
particularly centering around John Dodds of PUP At the lunch, 
Dodds sat flanked by Danny Chmelko of I AM Local 1717 and Frank 
Redmiles of UAW Local 1612. While both men took turns praising 
Dodds, Redmiles emphasized the need to tone down the militancy 
now. Chmelko, who was tapped by the Philadelphia AFL-CIO Central 
Labor Council (CLC) to coordinate Greyhound strike support 
activities and then turned around to become the main challenger for 
the CLC presidency last fall, urged greater militancy. 
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Plant closings are still occurring, but there is a cautious tendency 
in local unions not to want to go public with a DVCJ campaign. There 
has been such a bleeding of jobs already that unionists are hurting 
and wary that activism may push management into leaving. 
Moreover, activity on plant closings periodically has taken second 
or third place to electoral involvement or strike support, such as in 
the Greyhound case. In addition, the Philadelphia AFL-CIO CLC 
tends to favor quiet, nonadversarial paths to job-saving, such as 
through the Philadelphia Area Labor-Management Committee 
(PALM). 
Still, as Ann Schwartzman of PUP points out, the DVCJ steering 
committee meets several times a year and keeps the contacts and 
communication going. And as Rev. Gracie says, when a union does 
want to go public, the coalition and its tactics are just a phone call 
away. 
Some Inherent Limits 
Despite an impressive amount of activity, there are some serious 
limits to the work of the jobs coalitions. 
First of all, the focus on plant closing legislation limits the 
consciousness raised and the solutions proposed. In fact, in 
Philadelphia passage of the plant closing ordinance seems to have 
led to the perception that the battle had been won, rather than that 
labor now had a new weapon. Similarly, economic problems of 
enormous complexity and the intricate dynamics of multinational 
capitalism often get compressed into the simple notion of "corporate 
responsibility." Though this simple concept can easily lead to much 
more probing questions about the political economy, it can easily 
pass over the deeper issues too. Corporations like Sun Ship, which 
voluntarily provide advance notice, severance benefits, and concern 
for the community, may be taken off the hook. Though occasional 
actions like these are far better than simple, brutal shutdowns like 
the Cross Brothers plant, they do little to blunt the power of big 
corporations to take the money and run. Instead, the notion of 
corporate responsibility may lead to a new version of noblesse oblige. 
Secondly, there are limits to the nonlegislative activities of the jobs 
coalitions. Mobilizing workers around a particular closing and helping 
them achieve a between shutdown settlement can be useful and 
consciousness-raising. But it does not change the basic decisions of 
corporations, nor does it lead to permanent coalition-building, for 
after the shutdown most workers will go their own ways in picking 
up their lives again. Even in DVCJ, which has formed a core of 
activists, many of those involved in particular campaigns have drifted 
away. Some union activists, like Joe Pedrick of UPIU and the CCA 
fight, have apparently been blacklisted in their attempts to find new 
jobs, 
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jobs. Unemployment has been more likely to lead to demoralization 
than to activism. Furthermore, who does want to get involved? 
Activists, organizers, academics, clergy, and union officials may help 
sustain, but cannot substitute for a true mass movement. DVCJ 
worries about this, but has not come up with an answer. 
Thirdly, the local focus of the jobs coalition is another limit. Their 
spontaneity and autonomy insure direction by local activists and 
adaptation to the local context, rather than domination by national 
bureaucracies. But the lack of overall coordination requires local 
coalitions to reinvent the wheel, and weakens the fight for raising 
the issue nationally. Small wonder that national plant closing 
legislation is no farther now than it was in 1974, when it was first 
introduced. DVCJ is not organized to think strategically, either. Aside 
from answering the calls when they come, there isn't a sense of what 
to push for next. 
Conclusion 
As the capitalist economy shifts jobs and capital around, and as 
long-term stagnation brings frequent recessions, working-class 
poUtical movements are changing. Jobs coalitions are part of this 
change. 
The jobs coalitions may be harbingers of broader change in the 
tactics of organized labor and in its relationships to its allies and to 
broader political questions. While not all job coalitions have done 
as much agitation as DVCJ, all have done things to bring the issues 
to wider audiences and to strengthen their alliances. 
Though the jobs coalitions are relatively few, small, and limited 
in focus, they mobilize important political responses to corporate 
policies. They have great potential to: (a) link together various 
elements within organized labor over common economic issues; 
(b) broaden the appeal of labor unions to outside constituencies; 
(c) achieve a coalition not totally dominated by unions or by the 
Democratic party; (d) fight for political goals in conventional and 
unconventional ways; and, (e) raise fundamental issues concerning 
the economy. In fact, they raise the key question facing those 
interested in saving jobs and creating a full-employment economy: 
How can the public control corporations and capital? 
